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GROSSMAN

FEDERAL CLAIMS TO UNAPPROPRIATED WATERS
By

HON. CLIFFORD STONE,

Directorand Secretary, Colorado Water ConservationBoard, given

JUDGE

before the Association of Western State Engineers at Phoenix, Ariz.

STONE: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. According to the program my remarks shall be confined to a discussion of the paper entitled "Federal Claims to Unappropriated Waters" by Charles J. Bartholet. You have listened to a reading of that paper.
There appeared in the paper a resume of the claims of the
United States Government as set forth in the petition of intervention of the government in the case of Nebraska vs. Wyoming and Colorado. This suit is now pending in the United
States Supreme Court and was instituted for the purpose of
securing a judicial decree equitably apportioning the waters
of the North Platte River among the three states mentioned.
After the commencement of the suit the United States filed a
peition of intervention and was allowed by the court to intervene. On the principle that the government has federal investments on the river and should be permitted to protect its claim
to water necessary for the operation of structures built by the
government, such intervention was granted, but the claim that
the United States is the owner of all unappropriated waters
in the North Platte has not been passed upon by the court and
remains a question for adjudication in this litigation.
In order to understand the claim of the United States in
this case, which if sustained by the court, establishes a principle which would be applicable to all rivers in the West, some
of the specific statements of such claim contained in the petition
of intervention should be recited. These are:
"2.
France, Spain, and Mexico, by treaties with the United
States in 1803, 1819, and 1848, respectively, and Texas by agreement
with the United States in 1850, ceded to the United States territories
including the entire basin of the North Platte River.
"3.
By the aforesaid cessions the United States became the owner
of all lands and all rights in waters within the ceded territories with the
exception of lands and water rights which were privately owned at the
times of the cessions. There were no, or very few and limited, private
rights in the waters of the North Platte River at the times of the cessions.
'4. The rights of the United States in the waters of the North
Platte River did not pass to Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado upon
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their creation and admission to the Union, but remained in the United
States.
"5.
The United States has never, by Act of Congress or otherwise, abdicated or ceded away its rights in the waters of the North Platte
River except that by acquiescence in the local practices and by the Acts of
July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. 253), July 9, 1870 (16 Stat. 218), and
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 377), the United States adopted the practice
of permitting rights in the waters of the streams of the public domain
(including the North Platte River) to be acquired by private persons by
compliance with state and territorial law prescribing how rights in
waters could be acquired. From time to time private persons have, by
appropriation in compliance with the law of one of the litigant States,
acquired from the United States rights to use certain quantities of the
waters of the North Platte River, and from time to time the United
States, as is more specifically set forth hereinafter, has reserved waters of
the river for Federal reclamation projects. Waters so appropriated or
reserved were withdrawn from future appropriation, but rights in waters which have not been so appropriated or reserved are open to acquisition by private individuals as above described, all rights in such waters
remaining meanwhile in the United States."
"7.
For the purposes of the North Platte Project, as more particularly hereinafter described, the United States reserved and withdrew
from future appropriation certain quantities of the theretofore unappropriated waters of the North Platte River. Pursuant to Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act, and in order that an orderly system of priorities might
be maintained, the United States effected these reservations by procedure
substantially in conformity with the law of the State where the waters
were to be diverted as to the acquisition by appropriation of rights to the
use of water. In the case of waters to be diverted or stored in Wyoming
for use in Nebraska, the United States proceeded in conformity with the
law of Wyoming, and, as far as possible, with the law of Nebraska also."

The broad principle on which the government relies is
stated in the "Appendix to Motion on Behalf of the United
States for Leave to Intervene" as follows:
"* * * It is the contention of the United States that existing rights
to appropriate and use the waters of the non-navigable streams of the
public domain country are derived from the United States, either under
the acts of 1886, 1870, and 1877, or by tacit grants in the era preceding
those statutes; that these rights were granted by the United States, using
local customs and State and Territorial laws as subordinate instrumentalities only. It is the further contention of the United States that title
to all the water of the non-navigable streams of the public domain country which has not been granted away by the United States remains in
the United States."

In general the position of the states as indicated by reference to the "Objections to Intervention of the United States,"
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filed in the Supreme Court by Wyoming, is that the following
propositions have been established by decisions of the court:
"1. By the Act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. 377), if not before,
all unappropriated waters of non-navigable streams in the arid portions
of the public domain became property of the public subject to the plenary control of the states.
"2. There is no Federal statute authorizing the United States, or
any of its agencies, to make an appropriation of water except the Reclamation Act of 1902, and under that Act an appropriation of water may
be made by the Secretary of the Interior only in conformity with the
laws of the state or territory wherein the appropriation is made. The
Secretary of the Interior, as an appropriator of water, is in the same position as any other appropriator.
"3.
The United States is not the owner of unappropriated water
or of water rights under appropriations made by the Secretary of the
Interior, but such rights belong to the owners of the land upon which
the water is applied.
'4. The Congress in accepting, ratifying and confirming the Constitution of Wyoming agreed that the natural waters within its boundaries are the property of the State."

In explanation of the position of the United States, B. E.
Stoutmeyer, District Counsel of the U. S. Reclamation Service,
states in a letter to J. B. Fink, Director of the Department of
Conservation and Development, Olympia, Washington, as

follows:
"*
* * that the conditions which have made it necessary for the
United States to apply to the Supreme Court for permission to intervene
in the case of Nebraska v. Wyoming, are stated in the Government's
Petition to Intervene, and that the object of the Government's motion to
intervene is to be permitted to participate in the presentation of evidence
and argument in order to protect its extensive property and financial
interest in reclamation projects as well as to protect farmers and other
persons whose rights to water are derived from and dependant upon the
water rights claimed by the United States * * *
"The United States has asserted in its motion and petition that it
owns the waters of the North Platte River which it has appropriated for
its reclamation projects free from the 'sovereign supervision or control'
of the States. By that the United States means that the States have no
independent 'sovereign' control over the use by the United States of those
waters, but only such control as Congress has conferred upon them.
"It means that in the instance in which the Secretary is obliged to
comply with State law or is subject to State administrative control in
his conduct of the reclamation projects of the United States he is so
obliged or so subject by reason of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, or
some other act of Congress, and not by reason of the inherent force of
State law or authority alone. The United States recognizes, of course,
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that Section 8 of the Reclamation Act provided that the Secretary, in carrying out that Act, shall comply with State law. All that the United
States contends is that the obligations upon the Secretary to follow State
law comes from this provision or from other federal statutes, and not
from the force of State law alone. As is explicitly stated on page 69 of
the Appendix, the United States is not seeking to have the Supreme Court
pass at this time upon the question whether the provision of Section 8
that the Secretary shall comply with State law is directly or mandatory. * * *

"It is the position of the Government in this case that water rights
are acquired by compliance with State laws and customs, not because the
State owns the unappropriated water but because the United States,
which does own the unappropriated water, has provided by Act of Congress that the rights thereto shall be secured by individual appropriators
by compliance with state law. It will be observed at once that this is a
rather theoretical difference as to the origin of water rights, rather than
any difference as to how the rights are acquired or the validity or indefeasibility of the rights when acquired. That is, both the attorneys for
the States and the Solicitor General, representing the United States, agree
that it is necessary to comply with State laws in acquiring water rights and
that rights so acquired are vested property rights and indefeasible. But
the Solicitor General contends that this is true because Congress so provided in the acts above quoted and that the water rights originally belonging to the United States thus became available for appropriation
under State law because Congress so provided and not because the States
have declared themselves to be the owners of such unappropriated waters.
The attorneys representing the States of Colorado and Wyoming, while
conceding that the United States originally owned all the unappropriated water, claim that the States have become the owners thereof either
because they declared themselves to be such owners in their state constitutions or for some other reason. This difference of opinion, however, as
to the origin of water rights does not involve any difference as to the
validity and effectiveness of water rights acquired by compliance with
state law nor any difference of opinion as to the authority of the state to
administer such vested rights as provided for in the state statute."

It will be observed that Mr. Stoutmeyer's statement evidences, as he admits, a theoretical difference of opinion as to
the origin of water rights. However, if the court should sustain the principle that the water rights become available for
appropriation under state laws because Congress so provided,
then these rights in the state are threatened because if these
rights were so granted by Congress, they can likewise be taken
away. On the other hand, if these rights are founded in the
constitutions of the several states as recognized and accepted by
the Congress, then they are secure. The principle claimed by
the government, if sustained by the Supreme Court, would lay
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a basis upon which the Congress may pass appropriate legislation revoking the grant to regulate and control the unappropriated waters of the streams of the West. If the position of
the states is sustained, then these rights are irrevocable. Constitutional provisions of the state, federal statutory enactments
and interpretations of the courts over a long period of time
have rendered these rights secure in the states; and the states
are not in a position where the water rights of its citizens and
the right to claim and appropriate water in the future is dependent upon a mere federal grant which may be revoked.
The government in recent years has established the policy
of control of power produced by federally-financed utilization
projects. Such projects are dependent upon a water supply.
If the government is attempting to establish a policy as to such
power through control of unappropriated water in the rivers
of the West, then irrigation development is submerged in order
to make more secure the government control over such power
devlopments. On the other hand, if the government in appropriating water under state laws is in the same position as any
citizen of a state, its rights arising no higher or no lower than
those of a citizen, then the security of the inhabitants of the
West in these water rights for all purposes is not jeopardized
and the government is adequately protected.
The ultimate legal question presented by the motion for
leave to intervene is whether the U. S. has an interest in the
subject matter of the litigation which the states are not competent to represent, or are not adequately representing, and
which, therefore, the U. S. is entitled to urge, as a party. The
motion sets forth two distinct interests of the U. S. which will
be affected by the litigation:
First, its interest in the appropriations of the waters of
the North Platte River which have been initiated by the U. S.
for federal reclamation projects; and, second, its claim to all
of the appropriated waters of that river.
The U. S. Supreme Court has heretofore ruled on the
motion of Wyoming to dismiss the complaint of Nebraska in
the instance case (Nebraska v. Wyoming and Colorado). One
ground in support of the request to dismiss was that the Secretary of the Interior was an indispensable party.
The court said (295 U. S. 40, 43):
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"The motion asserts that the Secretary of the Interior is an indispensable party. The bill alleges, and we know as matter of law, that
the Secretary and his agents, acting by authority of the Reclamation Act
and supplementary legislation, must obtain permits and priorities for the
use of water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as a private
appropriator or an irrigation district formed under the state law. His
rights can rise no higher than those of Wyoming, and an adjudication
of the defendant's rights will necessarily bind him. Wyoming will stand
in judgment for him as for any other appropriator in that state. He is
not a necessary party."

There would seem to be no reasonable distinction between the Secretary of the Interior representing one of the
government departments and the United States appearing directly through the Attorney General. It follows then in view
of this decision of the court that where one of the litigant
states moved to dismiss because the Secretary of the Interior
was not a party, the court established the principle that the
Secretary must obtain permits and priorities for the use of
water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as a
private appropriator or an irrigation district formed under the
state law; and that his rights can rise no higher than those of
Wyoming. Since the ownership in water is nothing more
than the right to use it, it would seem from this statement just
cited that such right can be acquired only through the state
government; and that claim to "ownership in all unappropriated water" is an empty phrase which has no bearing on the
substantial rights involved. Wiel in his work "Water Rights
in the Western States" (3rd Ed.), pp. 752-755, states:
"Because of its fugitive nature, the only property rights which exist

in water in its natural state, under either the riparian rights or the appropriation doctrine, are rights of use, the corpus being susceptible of
ownership only while in possession."

The principle set forth in the last quotation seems to be
accepted by the government. Such a principle taken in connection with the announcement of the Supreme Court (last
quoted above) shows that an academic discussion of the origin
of the states' rights lends no weight to a determination of the
question as to ownership in all unappropriated waters. The
assertion of ownership in all unappropriated water is a naked
claim if such ownership cannot be enjoyed except through recognition of the right to use such water by observance of state
laws and regulations.
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The farmer who places the water to a beneficial use is the
beneficiary. It is his use by observing all state laws and regulations which establishes the right. His exercise of this right
must be controlled by the same law which limits and establishes the rights of other water users out of the same stream.
A farmer under a federal reclamation project has no different
rights from those enjoyed by any other appropriator. If the
United States observes the state laws and regulations in appropriating the water, then it acts only as a carrier and distributor
of such water; it is in the position of trustee for the benefit of
those water users and is not acting in a governmental capacity.
Its rights in litigation are represented by the state.
The litigation over the waters of the North Platte in
which the government claims ownership to all unappropriated
water involves a determination of the proper division of the
flow of the stream as between the litigant states. If the United
States on a federal reclamation project owns all rights of appropriation free from the sovereign control of the states
through which the river flows (as is claimed by the government), then the principle of equitable apportionment is nullified so far as arid states are concerned. There remains, if this
claim of the government is correct, no basis upon which an
equitable apportionment of unappropriated water can be determined. The unappropriated water would not be apportioned on an equitable basis to the citizens of the litigant states,
but would go to water users under federal reclamation projects
constructed in the various states and a race between the states
to secure reclamation projects which would finally appropriate
all of the unappropriated flow of the stream and be substituted
for equity.
That the state represents all appropriators of water is
sustained in other Supreme Court cases. In Kansas v. Colorado, 206, U. S.46, as follows:
"While several of the defendant corporations have answered it is
unnecessary to specially consider their defenses, for, if the case against
Colorado fails, it fails also as against them."

The court held in Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U. S.494,
508, as follows:
"But it is said that water claims other than the tunnel appropriation could not be and were not affected by the decree, because the claim-
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ants were not parties to the suit or represented therein. In this the nature
of the suit is misconceived. It was one between states, each acting as a
quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests and rights of her people in a controversy with the other. Counsel for Colorado insisted in
their brief in that suit that the controversy was 'not between private parties' but 'between the two sovereignties of Wyoming and Colorado;' and
this court in its opinion assented to that view, but observed that the
controversy was one of immediate and deep concern to both states and
that the interests of each were indissolubly linked with those of her
appropriators. 259 U. S. 468. Decisions in other cases also warrant
the conclusion that the water claimants in Colorado, and those in Wyoming, were represented by their respective States and are bound by the
decree."

Since the court in the Nebraska case has permitted the
United States to intervene without opinion and without passing upon the government's claim to all of the unappropriated
waters of the North Platte, and in view of the decisions above
cited, it is logical to assume that the court recognized the interest of the government as appropriator for the actual users and
as an investor on the river and by such permission to intervene
made provision for the government being adequately represented in the proceedings. There is no indication that such
intervention was permitted on the basis that the government
is recognized as owning and in control of all unappropriated
waters to the exclusion of what we believe to be the well-recognized rights in the states; but pending this litigation and
before the final decree is entered in the case it is necessary that
the states defend their rights to control the use and appropriation of water, which is tantamount to ownership.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 (C.
1093, 32 Stat. 388), provides as follows:
"Sec. 8. That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting
or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State
or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act,
shall proceed in conformity with such laws, * * *"

Respecting this federal provision, the Solicitor General
of the United States in his brief states:
"*
* * As made clear in the Appendix to the Motion of the
United States (pp. 68, 69), no question is here at issue concerning the
authority or present applicability of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
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That section, it may be assumed, requires exact conformity with State
law in the administration of the Reclamation Act, save as Congress has
otherwise expressly directed. * * *"

The government's interpretation of this clause is most
interesting when we note the following:
"What is solely important is that if the existing exceptions to the
requirement of conformity are valid, and if Congress has power further
to depart from that requirement in the future, then the rights of the U. S.
in the waters appropriated for federal reclamation projects do not fall in
the same category as do the rights of private appropriators. * * *"

It will be observed that the position of the United States,
as disclosed by the above statements. is that the Congress in
passing the Reclamation Act of 1902 consented to a conformity of state laws in the administration of water rights and the
control of waters appropriated for reclamation projects, but
that Congress has power "further to depart from that requirement in the future," and that, therefore, the rights of the
United States fall in a different category from that of private
appropriators. In other words, the government takes the position that this provision represents a mere acquiescence by
Congress in the control by the states of the water rights, with
implied reservation to revoke any such law, and that future
federal legislation may provide for taking water for federal
projects free from the sovereignty of the states and in utter disregard of these rights as they have been recognized in the past.
This position goes further than the statement contained in
Stoutmeyer's letter, a portion of which is above quoted. He
states that:
"Both the attorneys for the states and the Solicitor General representing the United States agree that it is necessary to comply with state
laws in acquiring water rights and that rights so acquired are vested
property rights and indefeasible."

The proper interpretation of the Reclamation Act and
other federal legislative provisions respecting this subject
would seem to be that the Congress in passing the Act did not
merely acquiesce in the state laws, but on the contrary recognized the rights of the states to control the appropriation and
use of water for irrigation and other purposes. In other words,
there has been a deliberate congressional intent to recognize
these states' rights. Such recognition has ample foundation in
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the customs, constitutions of the several states, and constitutional interpretations by decisions of the federal and state
courts. Reference is made in the government brief to the Acts
of 1866 (14 Stat. 253), 1870 (16 Stat. 218), 1877 (19 Stat.
377). In the last cited statute, after providing that a claimant's right to the use of water depends upon bona fide prior
appropriation, it is expressly stated that:
* * all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation
and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of
water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and
be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights."
"*

Sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution provides as follows:

"Sec. 5. Water, Public Property: The water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the State, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided."
"Sec. 6. Diverting unappropriated water: Priority: The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better
right as between those using the water for the same purpose; but when
the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic
purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other
purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have
preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes."

Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
passing upon the federal acts above cited have supported the
principle of dedication of the waters of nonnavigable streams
to the public for appropriation and use under state laws.
In California, Oregon Power Company v. Beaver Portland Cement Company, 295 U. S. 142, the Court holds that
the effect of the Desert Land Act was to sever the water from
the land and that a grantee in a patent would only take (295
U. S. 162) :
"the legal title to the land conveyed, and such title and only such
title, to the flowing waters thereon as shall be fixed or acknowledged
by the customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their location."

The Court further held that the nonnavigable waters on
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the public domain became "publici juris, subject to the plenary
control" of the states, in language as follows:
"What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before
all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states * * *
with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of
appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights
should obtain."

In Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, the Court held:
"Although the Government diverted, stored and distributed the
water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water
or water rights became vested in the United States is not well founded.
Appropriation was made not for the use of the Government, but, under
the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landoWners; and by the terms
of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water rights became the property of the landowniers, wholly distinct from the property
right of the government in the irrigation works. * * * The Government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water
* * * , with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as
reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works. As security therefore, it was provided that the government should have a lien upon the lands and the
water rights appurtenant thereto-a provision which in itself imports
that the water rights belong to another than the lienor, that is to say,
to the landowner."

Referring to the Desert Land Act in this same decision
the following language was used:
"Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of land was not
to carry with it a water right; but all nonnavigable waters were reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the various arid-land
states."
Provisions similar to those contained in the Colorado
Constitution, above quoted, are embodied in the Constitutions
of Wyoming and other irrigated land states and these constistitutions in one form or another have been approved by the
National Congress.
It is, therefore, clear that by the Reclamation Act of 1902
and other federal enactments, the Congress has recognized the
well established principle that the water of nonnavigable
streams is dedicated to the public for appropriation and use
under the state laws; and may I repeat that because of the
fugitive nature of water the control, under state laws, of its
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appropriation and use is tantamount to ownership and the
academic discussions by the Government of the origin of these
rights is without legal force.
QUINN: Thank you, Judge Stone, for such an able
discussion on the subject of the Federal claim. We yet have a
little time for discussion from the floor.
MR. HYATT: Judge Stone, do you know the reason for
this particular position taken by the Attorney General? I
haven't heard those letters you referred to. Would like to ask
what position you recommend this Association to take, if
any? This Association is very much interested in this subject.
Do you advise a resolution advocating attitude of the various
states?
STONE: In answer to your question, the matter may be
approached in two ways; namely: First, by passing an appropriate resolution expressing the views of this association;
and, second, the several arid states interested in this matter
may find it advisable to file briefs in the pending litigation on
the North Platte as friends of the Court, and in such briefs
cover only the opposition to the position of the Government
that it owns all unappropriated water in the nonnavigable
streams of the West. The states probably do not have such an
interest in the pending litigation that a petition of intervention
would be entertained by the Court.
MR. HYATT: Judge Stone, in submitting a brief would
it be necessary for a state to submit the matter to the legislature?
STONE: Probably I should not attempt to answer that
question, but may I suggest that in one state it was the Attorney General's suggestion that the matter was of sufficient importance that the legislature should be asked to authorize the
filing of the brief covering the question in the Supreme Court
and make sufficient appropriation for such purpose.
MR. MCCLURE: There is a question of upholding constitutional rights of Wyoming and Colorado; also rights that
exist under the Reclamation Act. In granting authority to
certain federal agencies to appropriate water under state laws
that are in operation, what effect would that have on federal
agencies that have in the last year secured statutes to go ahead
and make use of waters?
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There might be some infringement on water rights
claimed by another federal agency not tied down definitely
under Congressional acts. We should see to it that all water
development of any kind by a federal agency recognizes the
state laws. In the final analysis the welfare of the states and
those who sell water under these projects require the state laws,
rules and regulations are followed and I believe that can be
brought about by the Court.
HUMPHREYS: I would like to ask Judge Stone whether
or not the states of Wyoming and Colorado and several others
attempted to influence the Attorney General to such an extent
that he did go forward with your request and change his position in face of intervention. Perhaps this is a dangerous time
to pass resolutions. Perhaps we should rely on the papers
which are now on file in the Supreme Court of the United
States. These letters, I believe, are the immediate results of
pressure-pressure not sufficient to withdraw its claim if any
water is open for adjudication under it. I believe the Reclamation Bureau regrets that this position was ever taken. The
Reclamation Bureau has cooperated with these states in the
matter of water rights and reclamation projects for construction.
STONE:
The Attorney General of the three states of
Nebraska, Wyoming and Colorado consulted with the Solicitor General and other federal officials on this matter. I shall
not attempt to set forth those discussions but it is clear that
after they were had the Government in the last briefs filed in
the case continued to claim ownership in all unappropriated
water of the North Platte.
CRAMER:
I have been connected with the federal government for a long time. In our department we are required
before licensed to use water to see that the licensee complies
with the state laws and determine what is the most important
use of the water, whether essential to irrigation or domestic
uses.

In view of the success of recent Colorado institutes the following
article will probably be of interest to the members of the bar.

HOW LEGAL INSTITUTES WERE BROUGHT TO
IOWA LAWYERS
By PAUL B. DE WITT
Former Secretary, Iowa Legal Institute Committee; Assistant
Secretary, American JudicatureSociety

Ois

RGANIZATION of legal institutes for small local bars
currently occupying a prominent part in the program
of a number of state bar associations. With over fifty
institutes having been held in the larger cities since the Cleveland meeting of the American Bar Association, it is apparent
that lawyers everywhere are eager to take advantage of opportunities which are offered for bringing themselves up to date
on current developments in the law. These opportunities are
not being confined to the large cities and the spread of small
local or district institutes has been equally remarkable. Their
organization has been fostered largely by the state bar associations, and an account of the successful experience of Iowa in
this field is therefore timely.
The genesis of the Iowa or district idea for legal institutes
was quite casual. At the Kansas City meeting of the American
Bar Association in 1937 the president of the Iowa Association,
Mr. Burt J. Thompson, and his good friend, Mr. Frank W.
Senneff, wandered into a section meeting where the subject of
legal institutes was under discussion. The talk centered
around institutes for large cities, and the experiments in Cleveland, Toledo and New York were being used as examples.
After the meeting was over Mr. Thompson turned to his
friend and said, "Let's try that idea in Iowa."
Now both of these lawyers were from a judicial district
in which the largest city had a population of only 25,000, and
this district was typical of Iowa judicial districts. Obviously,
if the institute idea was to work in Iowa the plan for the city
institute would have to be modified. In the first place the bar
was not numerous enough to contribute funds to engage some
outstanding authority to conduct the institute. The members
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of the bar lived in widely scattered small towns, which meant
that to attend an institute they would have to drive considerable distances. Finally, there were very few districts which
had an organized bar and hence there was no group through
which to work.
These difficulties were surmounted in the most simple
and direct way. Local judges and attorneys who had a special
interest in some legal subject were secured for speakers at the
institutes. It was rather surprising how many of the local
bench and bar had these specialties. An examination of the
briefs of the first talks reveals exceptionally well prepared papers with citations to the best in current legal literature. To
overcome the difficulty of getting a widely scattered bar to
attend, it was decided to limit the institutes to one day and to
secure the adjournment of the courts for that day. A discussion was planned for the afternoon, followed by a social hour.
Then a dinner was served and the second discussion was held
after dinner. The meeting was adjourned in time to allow the
attorneys to drive home the same evening.
A much more serious problem was the lack of organized
units of the bar in the districts. Again the solution was simple
and direct. Mr. Thompson carried the plan to the districts
personally. He first sold the local bar on the institute plan
and then the district was organized for the purpose of holding
the institutes. As soon as the district bar had some concrete
reason for getting together, an organization was easily formed.
The importance of the institutes as a means of organizing the
local bar and as a reason for the existence of local associations
cannot be exaggerated.
The result of this activity at the end of the first year was
astonishing. At the beginning of the year Iowa had between
fifty and sixty county associations. At the end of the year
there were eighty-five associations. At the beginning of the
year six district associations were functioning. By the end of
the year the number had increased to twelve. Legal institutes
had been held in thirteen judicial districts, which included
sixty-four of Iowa's ninety-nine counties. Every lawyer in
the district regardless of membership in a bar organization was
invited to attend, with the result that an average of nearly
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seventy-five per cent responded. This was all accomplished
at no cost to the individual lawyer except the cost of the dinner, which was set at one dollar.
As a result of the success of the first year's program an
Institute Committee of the state association was appointed,
with Mr. Senneff as chairman. This committee acted as a
clearing house for securing competent and prepared speakers.
Activities were centered in the office of the state law librarian,
who acted as secretary for the committee. The librarian's staff
was made available to the speakers to help them in the preparation of their discussions. The work of the committee was
financed by voluntary contributions, and a fund of over
$1,500 was secured by appeals by letter from the chairman of
the committee and by his committee members, one of whom
was assigned to each district.
A very definite effort was made from the first to "stylize"
the program. A very attractive letterhead was used. A rather
elaborate prospectus or schedule of courses was prepared,
which indicated some thirty courses grouped under such headings as "Problems in Administrative Law," "Problems in the
Law of Evidence," "Problems in Probate Law," etc. The
committee was careful to refer to the lawyers who were to give
the discussions as the "faculty" of the institutes. The prospectus was so attractive and the speakers so well known to the
bar of the state that it was considered something of an honor,
which in fact it was, to be included on the faculty. The committee was embarrassed by the number of attorneys asking to
be placed on the list of speakers. As a method of giving the
program added prestige, the popular chief justice of the supreme court, Richard F. Mitchell, was asked to serve as honorary chairman of the committee. Mr. Justice Mitchell became
very much interested and actively contributed to the support
of the program.
Perhaps the most popular feature of the plan was that the
committee arranged to mimeograph briefs or digests of all the
talks that were given and to distribute them to the lawyers
attending the institutes. These abstracts, since the talks were
limited to subjects of interest to the practicing lawyer, proved
to be valuable, timely and authoritative briefs with particular
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reference to Iowa law. District judges would write to the committee asking for the briefs to guide them in the decision of
some case pending before them.
Although the central committee organized and directed
this program, it was careful to leave the responsibility for the
actual conduct of the individual institutes in the hands of the
local district organizations. The district chose its own speakers and made its own arrangements. The central committee
merely guaranteed to have the speaker at the institute, printed
and distributed the briefs of his talk, and paid the traveling
expenses of the speaker. The committee was particularly
careful to use only its own funds for institute work; the state
association was not called upon to meet any of the expense.
The results of the more careful organization of the institutes in the second year have been most encouraging. Already
nine district institutes have been held. A continuing organization has been effected and a great impetus has been given to
the organization of district associations. The bar has been
unified and this in spite of the fact that before the institute program was inaugurated it had been somewhat divided by a campaign for bar integration. There is no thought of giving up
the institute plan or of going back to what Mr. Walter Flory
of the Cleveland bar once described as the "incessant 'gladhanding' and not always inspiring after-dinner speaking
which * * * characterize bar meetings." Thus, starting out
quite by chance, proceeding with a very simple and direct
method of organization, the Iowa bar has worked out successfully the "district idea" for institutes in states where the
city or Cleveland plan cannot be used. Many states are following this plan of organization: Colorado has had three
institutes, Nebraska three, North Dakota five, Washington
one, Ohio nine. In every case the plan has been a success.
Wisconsin has worked out a most successful plan of "clinics"
along the same general lines. Kansas, West Virginia and
Georgia have completed definite arrangements for holding institutes. Apparently the "district idea" has passed the experimental stage.
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COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION BOARD OF
GOVERNORS MEETS
The Board of Governors of the state bar association
gathered at the Denver Athletic Club at a luncheon meeting on
May 15, 1939, to hear reports and make recommendations
affecting the association. G. Dexter Blount of Denver, president of the state bar, was host to the governors at the luncheon.
Thurman Arnold, of the United States Attorney General's
office at Washington, D. C., also a guest at the meeting, made
a few brief remarks.
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As a tribute to his outstanding work in revitalizing and
reorganizing the state association, Wilbur Denious of Denver,
the past president, was selected by the Executive Committee to
represent the state bar in the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The Executive Committee acted under
authorization given it at the 1938 annual meeting in the selection of the representative, and its selection was heartily received
by the governors.
Stanley Wallbank of Denver, as chairman of the committee on the organization of local bar associations, reported
that practically all sections of the state were now represented
by affiliated local associations in the Colorado Bar Association.
The petition of the Ninth Judicial District Association to become affiliated with the state organization was received by the
governors and unanimously approved. A large credit of the
work for the organization of this local association belongs to
Judge John R. Clark of Glenwood Springs, according to Mr.
Wallbank. The only large area not now affiliated with the
state bar consists of the counties of Delta, Gunnison, Montrose, San Miguel, Hinsdale and Ouray. A committee has been
appointed in this district, however, and it is proceeding to
formulate a local organization to be affiliated with the state
unit. According to present indications, the small body of
lawyers in northwestern Colorado will probably join the
Western Slope Bar Association.
William R. Kelly of Greeley, president-elect of the state
association, spoke briefly on the success of the legal institutes
in Colorado. He stated that the institutes had by now become
an indispensable and vital part of bar association work.
The question of arrangements for the annual meeting
was presented by William E. Hutton of Denver as chairman
of the committee. He advised that Glenwood Springs, Troutdale, and Colorado Springs had so far presented invitations to
act as host to the yearly gathering. He also revealed that the
committee had under advisement a plan to devote an afternoon
session to a discussion of proposed Colorado rules of practice
and procedure.
Edward C. King of Denver presented the treasurer's report. He pointed out that the legal institutes had created
interest in the state bar and had facilitated the collection of
dues by the local associations.
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Since the reorganization of the state association, the secretary has had a vast amount of correspondence, according to
Fred Y. Holland of Denver. He reported that his office corresponded with associations located in other states and foreign
countries, as well as with members of the state bar. Copies of
the 1938 annual report have been distributed to state and local
bar associations in practically every state, as well as to the state
universities and to organizations in foreign countries.
After the meeting had adjourned, the committee on revision of the by-laws of the state bar met. Its work will be presented shortly to the state association for action. A resolution
of appreciation was extended to G. Dexter Blount for his
courtesy and hospitality as host to the group.
THE REVISION OF THE CODE
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE*

In the Supreme Court room on May 8th was held the
first meeting of the Colorado Bar Association Committee on
Revision of the Code to Conform to the Federal Rules. About
seventy lawyers were in attendance, including many of our
present judges. The next meeting will be held on June 12,
1939, at 7:30 o'clock P. M. in the Senate Chambers at the
state capitol.
Each member has been given a copy of the rules and
thirty-three pages of work sheets, and assigned to one of thirteen working committees, each under a chairman. These
chairmen and their assignments are as follows:
Group Number ]-Charles J. Simon, Colorado Springs. Initiation
of actions. Rules 1 to 6, 45, 71, 85 and 86.
Group Number 2-Mark Harrington, Denver. Pleadings. Rules
7 to 13 and 15 and 16.
Group Number 3-Mortimer Stone, Fort Collins. Parties. Rules
14 and 17 to 25, inclusive.
Group Number 4-Edward L. Wood, Denver. Depositions and
discovery. Rules 26 to 37, inclusive.
Group Number 5-Arthur H. Laws, Denver. Trials. Rules 38
to 44, inclusive, and 46 to 53, inclusive.
Group Number 6--Judge Charles C. Sackmann, Denver. Judgments. Rules 54 to 63, inclusive, and 68 and 70.
Group Number 7-Col. Fraser Arnold, Denver. Provisional and
final remedies. Rules 64 to 69, inclusive.
*Of Denver, Chairman in charge of Code Revision.
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Group Number 8-Judge John Adams, Denver. Appellate procedure. Rules 72 to 76, inclusive.
Group Number 9-Edward V. Dunklee, Denver. District and
county courts and clerks. Rules 77 to 83, inclusive.

The following committees deal with subjects mainly
outside the rules:
Group Number 10-Guy Brewster, Denver. Code remedies and
miscellaneous; mandamus, affidavits, arbitration, certiorari, contempt,
usurpation of office, attachments, garnishment, replevin, and venue.
Group Number I ]-Golding Fairfield, Denver. Real property;
disputed boundaries, foreclosure of mortgages, also Code Sec. 70 dealt
with primarily by Group 2, lis pendens, possession of realty, quiet title,
recovery of realty.
Group Number 12-Frank Swancara, Denver. Statute committee;
to search all the statutes for sections which belong in the Code.
Group Number 13-Carle Whitehead, Denver. Committee on
forms; this takes in forms prescribed by the Federal rules and all forms
in the Code, and drafting new forms for Colorado use.

The plan of procedure is that the Code is to be fitted into
the rules. When a rule is applicable only to the Federal courts,
that number is left blank. When Code provisions, such as
actions to quiet title, are not found in the rules, they will be
arbitrarily assigned additional rule numbers commencing with
number 100 (the last rule number is 86).
Each member will work on his own rule and corresponding Code sections. Then in the subcommittees this work will
be exchanged and argued out in conferences. If any rule affects members who have conflicting provisions under other
rules, these members will work out the details outside of their
own committees.
Monthly meetings of the full committee will be held, and
hereafter in the Senate Chamber. We learned, on May 8th,
why oral arguments are disliked by the court. The acoustic
qualities of the court room are so bad they can't be heard anyway! And as we want to hear what is said, we're moving
where we can hear it.
As a sample of inter-committee work consider Code sections 159 and 474 on County Courts. There are no corresponding rules. These involve the new nomenclature of
courts of record" instead of "district" and "county" courts.
Section 474 of the Code involves Sections 161 and 188
of Chapter 46, C. S. A.; Section 159 of the Code involves Sections 159 and 160 of the same chapter, and both involve
Group 9 and Group 12.
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At the monthly meetings prepared rules will be presented for the discussion of the whole group, and objectionable
features brought to the fore, and possibly sent back for reconsideration. When the entire job has been finished it will be
submitted to the state bar for consideration in the local bar
associations, then this work and bar criticisms will go to the
revision committee.
All lawyers, especially sitting judges, are welcome at these
monthly meetings, and if they wish to work on the subcommittees, all they have to do is notify the chairmen, and they
will get plenty to do.
PERSONNEL OF JUNIOR BAR COMMITTEES*
Previous articles have appeared in DICTA which were
explanatory of the form of organization and the general purposes of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference.
The specific program of the conference is being carried
out by its various committees with the aid of its officers and
council. The complete personnel of these committees is now
being announced. While the title of each committee is more
or less suggestive of the character of the work being assumed
by the committee, it is expected that subsequent articles will
appear in DICTA which will detail the purposes of the committees so that the members of the bar throughout the state will
realize what is sought to be accomplished. In this way it is
also hoped that individual members of the bar will know how
they may cooperate and assist in the activities of the conference
and will also know whom they should contact to do so.
OFFICERS OF THE COLORADO JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE
Chairman--- MARK H. HARRINGTON, Denver
Vice-Chairman - - - WARREN W. LATTIMER, Pueblo
Secretary-Treasurer

-

-

-

HUBERT D. HENRY, Denver

JUDICIAL DISTRICT CHAIRMEN COMPRISING COUNCIL
OF THE COLORADO JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE
District

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

George Fischer, Brighton
Charles W. Sheldon, Jr., Denver
Donald T. Horn, Lamar
Robert H. LaGrange, Colorado Springs

Charles R. Casey. Leadville
*This is the third in a series of articles dealing with the form of organization,
program, and general activities of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference.
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District
6. Stewart A. Shafer, Cortez
George F. Dodge, Jr., Montrose
7.
8. Barnard Houtchens, Greeley
9. Clifford H. Darrow, Glenwood Springs
10. Leo S. Altman, Pueblo
Robert L. Gee, Fairplay
11.
12. Raphael J. Moses, Alamosa
13. Paul E. Gemmill, Sterling
14. Fred A. Videon, Hayden
COMMITTEE ON MEMBERSHIP

H. Shields Mason, Denver, Chairman
Harold Taft King, Denver
J. Gordon Bartley, Pueblo
Albert B. Logan, Colorado Springs
A. Allen Brown, Delta
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SPEAKING

Win. H. Robinson, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Charles F. Keen, Pueblo
Quigg Newton, Jr., Denver
Stevens Park Kinney, Denver
COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENT AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATION

Darwin D. Coit, Denver, Chairman
David J. Miller, Greeley
Donald B. Robertson, Denver
Charles A. Petrie, Eads
Harry S. Silverstein, Jr., Denver
COMMITTEE ON MEETINGS AND ARRANGEMENTS

John W. O'Hagan, Greeley, Chairman
J. Gregory Donohue, Grand JuncCharles J. Ribar, Pueblo
tion
Truman A. Stockton, Jr., Denver
Edward J. Ruff, Denver
COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP

Thomas K. Younge, Grand Junction, Chairman
Carl A. Wyers, Denver
James Booth, Pueblo
John Ira Green, Antonito
COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM SUGGESTIONS

Douglas McHendrie, Denver, Chairman
Sydney E. Shuteran, Denver
Lawrence Thulemeyer, La Junta
Sidney R. Hahn, Florence
COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCES

Joseph L. Peterson, Pueblo, Chairman
Clyde H. Babcock, Colorado
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland
Springs
Joseph G. Hodges, Denver
Norman L. Comstock, Denver
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COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE

OF LAW

Fred M. Winner, Denver, Chairman
William Branch, Denver
Merrill A. Knight, Denver
Julius H. Sterling, Pueblo
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION

Jack Ramsay Harris, Denver, Chairman
Wm. V. Hodges, Jr., Denver
Richard M. Davis, Denver
James L. Weinmeyer, Denver
Donald S. Stubbs, Montrose
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR

Ora H. George, Denver, Chairman
William E. Anderson, Pueblo
Kenneth P. Montgomery, Central
Wayne D. Williams, Denver
City
COMMITTEE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS

Terrell C. Drinkwater, Denver, Chairman
George S. Graham, Denver
Timothy J. Hurley, Denver
Wayne Bannister, Denver
COMMITTEE TO SPONSOR NEWLY ADMITTED MEMBERS OF THE BAR

Norman E. Bradley, Denver, Chairman
Frank G. Steinmeyer, Canon City Samuel M. Goldberg, Denver
Allen R. Phipps, Denver
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SURVEY

Harlan Howlett, Boulder, Chairman
Julian R. Dunn, Greeley
William L. Gobin, Rocky Ford
Charles F. Stewart, Gunnison

OFFICERS CHOSEN BY LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS
The Otero County Bar Association elected the following
officers for the ensuing year: E. C. Glenn, La Junta, President;
Perry E. Williams, Rocky Ford, Vice-President; and H. W.
Allen, La Junta, Secretary and Treasurer.
The Otero County Bar Association completed its affiliation with the Colorado Bar Association, and membership in
the county bar association now carries membership in the state
association.
A special meeting of the association was held to consider
the question of closing offices on Saturday afternoons, in view
of the fact that the County Commissioners had voted in favor
of closing all offices in the court. The association voted that
all members close their offices on Saturday afternoon hereafter.
-GEORGE

COSAND, Correspondent.
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The annual meeting of the San Luis Valley Bar Association was held on May 8 in the District Court Room Chambers
in Del Norte, Colorado, at the opening of the local Rio Grande
term of court, at which meeting the following officers were
elected for the ensuing year: W. Scott Carrol, Del Norte,
President; Claude W. Corlett, Monte Vista, Vice-President;
and Ralph Ellithorpe, Del Norte, Secretary-Treasurer.
Various members of the bar association addressed remarks to the group in regard to the benefits and satisfactory
reorganization of the state bar association, and also the value
of the publication DICTA to the country lawyers.
The Association also met for its regular monthly meeting
in Monte Vista on the 29th of April and about twenty member lawyers attended the meeting. We were privileged at that
time to have with us as guests of the association, Jean Breitenstein and John Reed, members of the Denver bar.
At this meeting Colonel George M. Corlett related to the
members present the progress made to date in regard to the construction of the Wagon Wheel Gap Reservoir project sponsored by the Rio Grande Water Users Association, looking to
the final accomplishment of a twelve million dollar improvement.
-CHARLES
R. CORLETT, Correspondent.
M. E. H. Smith of Greeley was elected President of the
Weld County Bar Association at its annual meeting held at
Greeley in May. Other officers selected were L. J. West, Vicepresident; Ralph E. Waldo, Jr., Secretary-treasurer; and E.
H. Houtchens, E. T. Snyder, and Hubert D. Waldo, Jr., directors. Thirty members of the association were present at the
meeting.
Members of the Eighth Judicial Bar Association met in
Fort Collins on June 3. The principal speaker was Fred
Farrar of Denver, who spoke on the subject, "The Lawyers
of the Eighth Judicial District at the Turn of the Century."
The meeting was a home-coming event to Mr. Farrar,
Henry S. Sherman and William A. Bryans, all of whom formerly practiced in Fort Collins, but have since migrated to
Denver. Guests of the association at the meeting were Ralph
L. Carr, Governor of Colorado; members of the Supreme
Court; Byron Rogers; Fred Y. Holland; Newton C. Garbutt:
A. H. White; S. P. Howell; Wilbur Denious; G. Dexter
Blount; Edward C. King; and Stanley T. Wallban.

TAXATION OF TRUST FUNDS WHERE INVASION OF
CORPUS OCCURS AND REMAINDER LEFT
TO CHARITY
By J. E. ROBINSON of the Denver Bar
AN interesting and important decision was handed down

by the Supreme Court of this state on May 15th, in
case No. 14425, entitled the People of the State of Colorado v. the Colorado National Bank, as Executor of the Estate of Frederick J. McCombe, Deceased. It is interesting in
determining the questions raised, and important in view of
similar situations which may arise in the future. As the opinion did not state very fully the facts in the case, but referred to
the record for those facts, it is necessary to state the facts as so
shown in order that the question presented may be fully understood.
Frederick J. McCombe died September 18, 1936, a resident of Denver, leaving a will and an estate of an agreed net
value of approximately $33,000.
He left a widow who was sixty-nine years of age, and her
life expectancy was 8.97 years. She is incurably insane, and
has been cared for in a sanitarium for some twelve or fifteen
years.
Under his will the testator left all of his property to the
Colorado National Bank in trust for the support of his wife
during her lifetime, and to the Denver Foundation for charitable uses after her death. The will in question provided for
the support of his wife as follows:
"Out of the moneys and property constituting, or which shall
thereafter constitute, the assets of this trust, meaning thereby both the
principal of said trust and the income therefrom, I do authorize, direct
and require my said trustee to furnish and expend for my beloved wife,
* * * during her natural lifetime, full, proper, adequate and comfort-

able support and maintenance, * * * and for that purpose I do hereby
authorize, direct and empower my said trustee to use, first, the income
from said trust fund for that purpose, and if the income shall not be
sufficient for that purpose then to use so much of the principal of said
fund as may be necessary fully and adequately to support and care for
my said wife so long as she lives."

The will further provided that upon the death of his said
wife the remainder should go to the Denver Foundation for
charitable purposes. The remainder going to the Denver
Foundation is exempt from an inheritance tax, and the amount
thereof when ascertained must be deducted from the gross
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estate under the authority of subsection (c) of section 26,
chapter 85, C. S. A., as amended in 1937, which provides that
there shall be deducted from the gross estate

"the amount of all bequests, legacies, devises or transfers * * *
to or for the use of aany corporation * * * organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. * * *

The Attorney General filed his report claiming an inheritance tax upon the entire assets of the estate, less the widow's
exemption. The County Court entered its customary ex parte
order fixing the amount of the inheritance tax in accordance
with the report of the Attorney General. Objections were
filed to the order upon which there was a hearing, as a result
of which the court determined that the estate was not liable
for any inheritance tax.
In the County Court, as well as in the Supreme Court,
the Attorney General contended that by reason of the permissible invasion of the corpus of the trust for the purpose of the
support of the widow, the amount which would ultimately
go to charity was so indefinite and uncertain that it could not
be deducted. The contention of the executor was that the
amount necessary for the support of the widow and, therefore,
the amount which would ultimately go to charity, was capable, of being ascertained and determined with reasonable certainty.
Upon the hearing of the objections in the County Court,
and after testimony was taken, the court found and determined
that the amount necessary for the support of the widow during her life expectancy was approximately $19,000, of which
approximately $7,000 would be paid from income, and the
balance of $12,000 must be paid from the corpus of the estate.
and that the remainder of the estate which would go to the
Denver Foundation for charitable purposes was over $21,000.
The law upon the question is fairly well settled, although
it has been the subject of numerous discussions, principally in
the federal courts under a federal statute similar to the one
quoted above. Perhaps the principal case is that of Ithaca
Trust Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 151, wherein the court stated
that if the amount which would go to charity could be ascertained with reasonable certainty, it was deductible. In that
case, however, as in other cases it was stated that the probable
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income from the trust would be sufficient to support the life
beneficiary, but there appears to be no case holding that the
fact that it is necessary to invade the corpus of the estate for
the support of the life beneficiary renders the bequest to charity
indefinite or uncertain. The Attorney General conceded that
if the income was sufficient to support the widow the corpus
of the trust which would go to charity could be deducted, but
insisted that when it was necessary to invade the corpus for
that purpose, no deduction could be made.
It was the contention of the executor that it is not material whether or not in any given case the corpus was invaded,
the sole question being the amount which would ultimately
go to charity whether the corpus of the fund was or was not
invaded, and the Supreme Court so held.
As stated, the question is of much importance, not only
to trust companies and others administering similar trusts, but
to men who desire to provide for the ample support of their
widows, leaving the balance to charity.
COURT RULES ORDINANCES OF HOME RULE
CITIES CONTROL TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
The Colorado State Motor Patrol, acting under authority of the motor vehicle act and the state statutes, cannot enforce a traffic violation committed under the state motor vehicle act when it occurs in the city limits of the home ruled city,
according to a ruling announced by Judge John B. O'Rourke
in a recent case decided by him in the District Court of La
Plata County.
In the particular case the defendant was charged with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and reckless driving, contrary to the motor vehicle act. In this case the court quashed the information on
the ground that the acts sought to be charged under the information in this particular case were acts in nature of traffic violation occurring within the limits of the City of Durango, and
were of a local or municipal nature and subject to the exclusive
control of the city itself. The court based its opinion upon
the question of whether or not the conduct sought to be controlled by the state statutes, as well as the ordinances of the
City of Durango, which is a home ruled city, is a matter of
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purely a local or municipal nature, affecting the city only, or
one of a general nature, affecting the interests of the people of
the State of Colorado as a whole.
The court took the position that the decisions indicate
that traffic regulation generally without reference to the specific charge alleged in the information is lodged exclusively in the
municipality. The court further pointed out that the 20th
Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colorado
grants to home ruled cities exclusive control without legislative interference in matters local and municipal. The court
reached the conclusion that the information charges acts relating to matters of traffic regulation, which are exclusively
under the control of the municipal authorities, because based
upon matters purely local and municipal in their nature.
Therefore, regulation was lodged in the City of Durango.
-R.

FRANKLIN MCKFLVEY, Correspondent.

LAWYER DISBARRED FOR AIDING UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE
Another case condemning the lawyer who aids unlawful practice
of the law, is the recent case of "In the matter of Paul E. Tuthill, an
attorney," before the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department, April, 1939, New York.
Tuthill was found to have aided in unlawful practices of a corporation known as Transatlantic Estates V- Credit Compaay, Inc., upon
an investigation being made of the activities of the corporation, in New
York. In 1930, the corporation was dissolved in New York, and reorganized in New Jersey, the respondent aiding in all of its work when
the corporation continued its unlawful activities in New York State,
Tuthill continuing to reside in New York City.
The court found that the sole business of the corporation was
searching out and procuring claims, furnishing counsel and legal advice
and that such activities constituted the unlawful practice of the law.
The Respondent was disbarred.
Jerome Smith of Fort Collins is part-time instructor at the Colorado State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts this semester. He
is teaching commercial law.
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PERSONAL INJURIES -

NEGLIGENCE -

EVIDENCE -

INTEREST ON

JUDGMENT-American Insurance Company, et al. v. Naylor-

No. 14348, No. 14349-Decided January 30, 1939-District
Court of Boulder County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge--Judgments amended and affirmed.
HELD:
1. "Assuming as an abstract proposition of law that the
contention of defendants that they were entitled, under authority of
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Gustafson, 21 Colo. App. 478. 121 Pac.
1015, Pawnee Co. v. Powell; 76 Colo. 1, 227 Pac. 836, and other cases
cited, to have the jury instructed that if the testimony introduced by
plaintiff disclosed contributory negligence on the part of himself or his
agent, that defendant was relieved from showing contributory negligence
by his evidence, we think the failure so to instruct was not error in this
case.

2.
Evidence examined and found sufficient to sustain verdict that
defendant, R, was acting within scope of his authority as agent for codefendant, the insurance company, at time of accident.
3.
Evidence examined and found sufficient to sustain verdict that
accident was proximate cause of death of plaintiff's wife.
4.
Interest on a judgment for personal injuries, whether or not
resulting in death, may be recovered from date of filing of complaint.
5.
The title to an act as follows: "An act providing for interest
on damages for personal injuries," is sufficient to cover actions for damages resulting from both fatal or nonfatal injuries.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. EN BANC.

HABEAS CORPUS-CRIMINAL LAW-SPEEDY TRIAL-In re: Application of Anthony Russo. Russo v. Guthner, etc.-No. 14513Decided March 13, 1939-Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Writ denied.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that a criminal information was filed
against petitioner on January 21, 1937, that for 60 days police made
diligent search for accused, that they took into their custody and held
his car for over a year, that petitioner was arrested May 20, 1938, that
on June 4, 1938, he filed motion to dismiss the information on the
ground that he had not been accorded a speedy trial as required by section 16, article II, Colorado Constitution, and that motion was heard
and denied December 24, 1938, it is more apparent that the delay was in
apprehending petitioner than in giving him a speedy trial.
2.
The facts in this case do not bring it within section 485, chapter 48, C. S. A. 1935, which provides that, "if any person shall be com-
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mitred for any criminal * * * act, and not admitted to bail, and shall
not be tried on or before the expiration of the second term of the court
having jurisdiction of the offense, the prisoner shall be set at liberty
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. EN BANC.

CONTRACTS WITH STATE-PURCHASING AGENT-BIDS AND AWARDc
AS PLAINTIFF-PLEADINC,--John H
-NOTICE-TAXPAYER
McRoberts v. Ammons, et al.-No. 14523-Decided March 13
1939-District Court of the City and County of Denver-Hon
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: A taxpayer's suit seeking to enjoin various state officials
from accepting the delivery of, or paying for, certain trucks, snow plows
and other equipment which the complaint charges the defendants have
contracted to purchase for the state highway department, contrary to the
provisions of the administrative code of 1933, chapter 3, 1935 C. S. A.,
pertaining to the purchasing of equipment for state departments. The
trial court refused to grant the injunction. No allegation of fraud or
collusion appeared in the complaint.
HELD: 1. Section 33, chapter 3, 1935 C. S. A., although decreeing no precise method of advertising or notification for bids on equipment to be purchased for the state, clearly imports that the purchasing
agent shall receive competitive bids under standard specifications prior
to the awarding of orders or contracts for the purchase of state department supplies, materials and equipment.
2. Where the only contacts with prospective sellers of such
machinery, or equipment is by the purchasing agent personally over
the telephone, or under his direction by representatives of the state
highway department, there has been no compliance with the law.
3. The discretion given to the state purchasing agent in awarding
the orders does not allow him to dispense with the receiving of bids as
required by statute.
4. "The mere calling for prices by telephone or personal contact
on trucks and equipment of predetermined make and brand, exclusively
from dealers selling such makes and brands and the issuance of purchase
orders to these dealers on the prices quoted, * * * does not even approximate the statutory requirement for competitive bids and award to
the lowest responsible bidder."
5. Contracts made contrary to the provisions of the statute concerning bids and awards are invalid.
6. The defense theory that the plaintiff was without right or
capacity to sue, because he had no litigious right or interest, since it was
not established that his burden as a taxpayer would be increased appreciably by the contract, even if it was unauthorized, might be avail-
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able in some situations; but it is not applicable to this case where the
illegality of which complaint is made was ministerial and administrative in its nature and no question of interference by the courts in the
exercise of the political or executive discretion of state officials is involved.
7. Where the answer to the complaint denies the allegations of
a particular paragraph in the complaint, and goes on to state that "on
the contrary," the head of the state highway department did call for
competitive bids, and that prior to the purchase, he and the state purchasing agent, did ascertain from divers and sundry dealers, their best
prices for the equipment, and that in every instance the lowest responsible bidder was awarded the contract, such was not new matter,
but merely a reiterated denial of the allegations in the complaint.
8. The trial court erred in ruling that it was new matter and
therefore admitted as true because the plaiantiff filed no replication. Since,
under the trial court's ruling no evidence was introduced by the defendant on this point, the injunction will not be granted, but the case
reversed and remanded.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bakke dissents.
EN BANC.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-VERDICT-IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICT
BY AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR-APPEAL AND ERROR-Wharton v.

People-No. 14511-Decided May 8, 1939-District Court of
El Paso County-Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge-Remanded with
Directions. EN BANC.
HELD.
1. It is the general rule that a verdict may not be impeached by the affidavit of a member of the jury.
2. But there may be circumstances where it would be impossible
to refuse such affidavits.
3. Where it appears that in a murder trial eleven jurors were for
the death penalty and the twelfth was for life imprisonment only, and
after many hours of deliberations the single juror acquiesced, and shortly
after the verdict was received and the jury discharged, voluntarily went
to attorneys for the defendant and made affidavit of the coercion and
force used upon him to make him change his mind, the trial court
erred in sustaining the district attorney's objection to the reception and
consideration of the affidavit without inquiry into the facts.
4. The trial court is to determine if the facts set out in the affidavit are true. If they are, the fundamental rights of the defendant have
been violated since the law of the land requires 12 jurors, not eleven,
to fix the penalty.
5. It is not within the province of the appellate court to pass
upon questions not acted upon from which appeal is taken. The lower
court is therefore to set aside the judgment and sentence and proceed to
a determination of the truth of the affidavit.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
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STATUTES RELATING TO TITLE TO REAL ESTATE
PASSED BY 1939 SESSION OF COLORADO
LEGISLATURE
H. B. No. 841-Relating to joint tenancies in real estate and
amending Sec. 4, Chap. 40, 1935 C. S. A. so as to permit a joint tenancy
in real estate to be created by deed from the owner to himself and another.
This is not retroactive.
H. B. No. 1082-Relating to tax deeds to county and permitting
several parcels owned by same person or persons to be included in one
application for tax deed and in one tax deed to county, although sold
separately.
H. B. No. 200-Relating to issuance of tax deeds to county and
to leasing and sale of real estate conveyed to county by tax deed.
S. B. No. 265-Relating to the application of statutes of limitations to persons under legal disability.
S. B. No. 401-Concerning acknowledgments to deeds and other
instruments relating to or affecting title to real property; this act reenacts Sec. I, Chap. 123, 1937 Session Laws, adding thereto the
language that was through mistake omitted from the 1937 act. This
is the statute referred to on page 81 of March, 1939, issue of DICTA.
S. B. No. 402-Concerning foreclosure of mortgages, deeds of
trust and other liens where owner of the property has died or has become
a mental incompetent or where the indebtedness secured constitutes a
claim against the estate of a decedent or against a mental incompetent
and amending Secs. 65, 66, 67 and 68, Chap. 40 and Sec. 208, Chap.
176 and repealing Secs. 209 and 210, Chap. 176, 1935 C. S. A. This
is the statute referred to on page 48 of February, 1939, issue of DICTA.
S. B. No. 404-Authorizing recording of certified copies of papers
and orders in bankruptcy proceedings, in order to come under the provisions of Sec. 21 (g) of the Chandler Act (which is the Federal Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1938).
S. B. No. 582-Relating to joint tenancies in real estate and providing that no will or other testamentary disposition of one of the
owners in joint tenancy of real estate shall destroy or affect the joint
tenancy. The purpose of this act was to relieve the situation caused
by language in the opinion in the case of Estate of Liden, 103 Colo. 58,
65 that a will (which speaks as of the time of death which is later than
the instrument creating a joint tenancy) which is inconsistent with
joint tenancy and survivorship will control over the instrument creating
the joint tenancy.
S. B. No. 403-Revising the entire Chapter XXXVI of the Code
of Civil Procedure relating to the perpetuation of testimony.
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Robert McCreary was recently elected vice-president of the Young
Democrats organization of Larimer County.
Dale E. Shannon of Fort Collins is the newly-appointed Conciliation Commissioner in Bankruptcy for the counties of Larimer, Grand
and Jackson.
David Miller of Greeley became a father on March 3 1. It was a
boy, named Walker David Miller.
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